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Volume 68, Number 4 1997
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: DIVERSITY OF
OPINIONS-AN OVERVIEW OF THE
COLORADO LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM
JEAN STEFANCIC*
Three decades after enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,1 affirmative action has become once again a lightning
rod-the focus of attention by legislators, university governing
boards, newspaper editors, and courts. Debate about affirmative
action addresses questions of legality, fairness, and the various
rationales put forth to justify or condemn it. As controversial as
the issue itself are the questions of who should be able to put
affirmative action programs and policies into effect, and on what
kind of showing.
In 1964, Congress passed civil rights legislation prohibiting
race and gender discrimination by private employers, agencies,
and educational institutions receiving federal funds.2 Shortly
thereafter, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order
11,246, which provided equal opportunity to qualified federal
employees, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin.3
Congress then created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to advise and review federal affirmative action
policies.4 By the 1970s, federal agencies began enforcing regula-
tions calling for timetables and goals to implement affirmative
action. Opponents of the measures began referring to them as
quotas.
* Research Associate, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1996).
2. See id.
3. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 & 42 U.S.C.).
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Regents of the University of California v. Bakke5 brought new
resistance to affirmative action policies and charges of reverse
discrimination. Once a policy issue, affirmative action increas-
ingly became subject to judicial review with a line of cases
running from Bakke to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena' and
Hopwood v. Texas.7 A concerted effort to dismantle affirmative
action programs gained strength in the 1980s when conservative
think tanks and foundations that funded them mounted cam-
paigns and lawsuits to have the programs declared unconstitu-
tional.'
In 1996, affirmative action was assailed on two fronts in the
nation's two largest states, Texas and California. In March, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in Hopwood that
the University of Texas Law School could no longer consider race
in admissions or financial aid decisions.9 The U.S. Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in July on grounds of mootnessl ° left
unresolved an important question: Could the Texas higher
education affirmative action policies continue to comply with the
1964 Civil Rights Act if those policies were to become race-
neutral? Texas attorney general Dan Morales had the final word
in a legal opinion that mandated abolishing affirmative action,
not only at the University of Texas Law School, but in all public
colleges and universities in Texas." Texas legislators have
subsequently introduced several bills in the hope of retaining
diversity and increasing minority enrollment.
In November 1996, Californians passed Proposition 209 with
fifty-four percent of the vote, prohibiting race and gender
preferences in state hiring and contracting, as well as in higher
education admissions. 2 A suit filed the following day by civil
rights attorneys in San Francisco won a preliminary injunction to
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
7. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
8. See JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE
THINK TANKS AND FoUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOcIAL AGENDA 45-81 (1996).
9. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932.
10. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
11. Opinion Letter from Dan Morales, Texas Attorney General, to William P.
Hobby, Chancellor, University of Houston System (Feb. 5, 1997) (No. 97-001) (on file
with University of Colorado Law Review).
12. See Edward W. Lempinen & Reynolds Holding, Affirmative Action/Legal
Duel over Prop. 209; Both Sides Sue, and Wilson Orders Immediate Enactment, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 7, 1996, at Al.
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prohibit the implementation of the proposition pending examina-
tion of the possibility that it might inhibit remedies that ad-
dressed past discrimination. 13 However, in April 1997, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a unanimous ruling
overturned the district court. 4 California supporters of affirma-
tive action have requested a rehearing by the full panel of the
Ninth Circuit.' 5
Where does this leave affirmative action? The lull following
the implementation of Proposition 209 in California and the U.S.
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Hopwood provide an
opportunity for further debate on a number of questions, some of
which the authors in this symposium address: Should a less-
qualified minority applicant be admitted over a white applicant
with stellar qualifications? And with what justification? What do
we mean when we talk about "merit" and "qualifications"?
Should we end race-based diversity programs and replace them
with ones based on class or disadvantage? If diversityprograms
are discontinued, what will happen to upward mobility for
minorities and women? What should we do about jury verdicts
colored by race--or about police or prosecutors who single out
minorities for special treatment?
Paul Butler reviews affirmative action's moral justifications,
including reparation for past discrimination, correction of present
discrimination, and diversity, and then applies these three
rationales to criminal defendants. Examining white supremacy
and the society it creates, Professor Butler argues that the three
rationales justify the extension of affirmative action to criminal
law. Furthermore, Professor Butler demonstrates how the
criminal law already countenances race-consciousness through
racial incongruity, segregation of racial groups in prison, and the
hiring of minority law enforcement personnel, and non-racial
fairness preferences through rape shield laws and proportionality
review in capital cases. Professor Butler then makes the case for
applying such considerations and preferences to black criminal
13. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
vacated, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997).
14. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997).
15. See Emelyn Cruz Lat, Groups Request Prop. 209 Review, Say Appeals Court
Panel's Upholding of Anti-Affirmative-Action Measure Is Unconstitutional, S.F.
ExAMINER, Apr. 23, 1997, at A7.
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defendants, offering six proposals to extend affirmative action to
criminal law.
Margaret Montoya critiques Paul Butler's justifications on
the grounds that they lack sufficient constitutional foundation
under current law. She examines an integrationist and a white
supremacist model of racial power, as well as ways the dominant
society racializes various groups. Professor Butler's jurispruden-
tial reform proposals, based on a white supremacy model, are
doomed, she believes, because Supreme Court Justices for the
most part adhere to an integrationist model. Professor Montoya
also questions who would implement the proposals, whether they
would imply preferences or quotas, and how strict scrutiny would
apply. Seeking to broaden the debate, she calls for a more
complex analysis of the criminal justice system that would take
into account the experiences of non-black racial minority groups.
Richard Collins does not agree that all of Paul Butler's
solutions, can be properly designated as affirmative action.
Though not all discriminatory actions can be litigated because of
the difficulty of proving intent, Professor Collins suggests that a
number of them might be subject to legislative remedies were the
majority motivated to provide such remedies. He then outlines
three approaches to address present-day racial discrimination in
the criminal justice system; to illustrate the difficulty of allocat-
ing the cost of affirmative action measures, Professor Collins
offers a reparations hypothetical. Like Professor Montoya, he
questions how Professor Butler's proposals, addressing only
African Americans and whites, would apply to other minorities of
color. He points out the effect of money and resources on a
defendant's ability to be acquitted regardless of race, and calls for
a less abstract, more pragmatic debate on affirmation action.
Seeking to persuade white liberals who, like herself, are
uncertain about affirmative action, Deborah Malamud contends
that racial preference programs for middle-class African Ameri-
cans are still justifiable. Professor Malamud argues that
although the diversity rationale is considered to be the only one
that the Supreme Court is likely to accept, discourse should not
be limited to this rationale because it is an imperfect justification
for affirmative action. Thus, she explores a compensatory
rationale for affirmative action for the black middle class and
examines many arenas in which the black middle class is
economically disadvantaged compared to its white counterparts.
Rejecting class-based affirmative action as too simplistic because
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it fails to account for the role of race discrimination in the
economic disadvantaging of middle-class blacks, Professor
Malamud concludes that race-based affirmative action is still
justifiable.
Sumi Cho, while commending Deborah Malamud's justifica-
tion of a compensatory rationale for affirmative action, vigorously
defends retaining the diversity rationale as well. Professor Cho
responds to Professor Malamud's critique of diversity by demon-
strating how the diversity rationale has the unique ability to
address the often overlooked and devalued claims of the cultural
injuries of racism. Furthermore, she points out that a diversity
approach to affirmative action has broad-based appeal and
enables coalition and community building. In addition, Professor
Cho faults Professor Malamud for not questioning the use of
criteria such as standardized testing to measure merit and for
confining her discussion of the harm of white supremacy and
racism to African Americans, thereby precluding reforms that
address discrimination against other people of color.
Fran Ansley lauds Deborah Malamud's admonitions about
tailoring discourse on affirmative action to fit Supreme Court
jurisprudence, as well as Professor Malamud's attention to the
combination of race and class in her comparison of middle-class
blacks and whites. However, she takes issue with Professor
Malamud's analysis on a number of points. First, she questions
the arena in which the debate on affirmative action takes place.
Rather than making intellectual arguments to unpersuaded white
professionals, Professor Ansley believes that affirmative action
proponents should turn to and learn from those at the
"bottom"-working class people of both races who have the most
to gain from affirmative action. Second, she articulates a more
complex analysis of how diversity and compensatory justifications
implicate and affect each other. Professor Ansley discusses six
values and goals that underlie affirmative action, thereby laying
the groundwork for a more nuanced approach to preference
programs and enlarging the debate to address questions of
working-class access to education and livelihood and to unmask
class privilege and oppression.
Focusing on admissions decisions of law and other profes-
sional schools, Michael Olivas examines admissions criteria such
as standardized test scores and grade point averages and
evaluates the predictive success of such measures. Turning to a
deeper analysis of statistical method, Professor Olivas then
19971
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reviews eight fair-selection models, showing how assumptions
that are neither value-free nor apolitical guide the choice of
variables used to make predictions about success in graduate
programs. After considering whether parts of Bakke have been
overruled, Olivas next examines a line of college admissions cases
beginning with that case and ending with Hopwood to show how
judges have viewed admissions criteria. Professor Olivas urges
that affirmative action be continued, praising admissions
programs that achieve diversity without relying solely on so-
called objective measures.
Jim Chen not only takes issue with Professor Olivas' assump-
tion that academic freedom allows educators to institute race-
conscious admissions policies without judicial scrutiny. He also
challenges the use of race as a public entitlement in the affirma-
tive action debate at large. Grounding his argument in an
analysis of Charles Reich's path-breaking and much-cited article
The New Property, which called for the Supreme Court to protect
and guarantee the economic security of individuals against an
unregulated market, he warns that affirmative action risks
extending an unhealthy new nonwhite property interest in race.
Using Professor Olivas' emphasis on the discretionary nature of
admissions policies as a springboard, Professor Chen then argues
that race preference entitlements, rather than being justified on
the basis of procedural due process, are more akin to the Takings
Clause because of the special status accorded to racial identity.
He warns that these entitlements place racial issues outside the
bounds of law into the public policy arena, which is more subject
to private biases.
Richard Delgado, in agreement with Professor Olivas,
proposes an additional approach to maintaining diversity in
admissions processes, namely remedial justice. Recounting
instances of Ku Klux Klan influence, antiblack admissions
policies, higher cost of living in no-growth university communi-
ties, and overt harassment of local people of color in those
communities, Professor Delgado advocates examining how
government and institutions of higher education have worked
together to perpetuate class privilege and discrimination. He
then questions the ability of standardized tests to predict legal
ability, giving an account of the professional achievements of
diversity admittees in his own law school class.
Jody Armour examines ways opponents of affirmation action
fail to deal with the empirical realities of race. Citing incidents
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of scapegoating, corporate racism, housing discrimination, and
the higher costs of mortgage loans and automobiles to minorities,
he questions the conservative assumption that racial discrimina-
tion is a thing of the past. He then distinguishes prejudice
(personal beliefs) from stereotypes (precognitive conditioning) and
analyzes stereotype-congruent responses to blacks and Hispanics
and the effect of stereotype vulnerability on young black test
takers. Professor Armour then discusses the concept of just
deserts in criminal law, whereby punishment meted out to an
offender must accord with judgments about the offender's
character, noting the controversies raised by law professor
Richard Delgado's proposal to exempt those submitted to brain-
washing and Judge David Bazelon's proposal to take into account
disadvantaged social background. In each instance, the proposals
were condemned on grounds that extending dispensation to
brainwashed and disadvantaged persons was motivated by
elitism and condescension and therefore insulted those persons.
Professor Armour then draws a parallel between these arguments
and those used by opponents of affirmative action who declare
that racial preference programs demean their beneficiaries.
Discussing preference arrangements that have little to do with
merit, such as buddy networks, government subsidies, and legacy
admissions programs, Professor Armour points out -that a
dominant group tends to make exceptions for programs that
benefit itself whereas it excludes, on merit grounds, proposals
that promote interests of marginalized groups.
Robert Nagel questions whether Professor Armour's empiri-
cal approach effectively refutes the conservative argument
against affirmative action articulated by Shelby Steele and
others. He focuses on each writer's skepticism about the objectiv-
ity and utility of judgments about moral culpability, showing that
for Armour endemic and continuing unconscious racial stereotyp-
ing surpasses the issue of conscious intent to discriminate, while
for Steele the debate over white guilt and black victimization
subverts the cause of minority advancement. Given the lack of
certainty about the consequences of affirmative action, Professor
Nagel argues that institutionally these policies be implemented
locally and not be subject to judicial decisionmaking that cannot
easily be reversed.
Evelyn Hu-DeHart examines white male privilege and re-
views the achievements of affirmative action. Though white
women fared better than minorities in affirmative action pro-
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grams during the past thirty years, they have yet to attain parity
with white males. Consequently, Professor Hu-DeHart believes,
minorities and white women do not compete with white males as
much as they compete with each other-a phenomenon borne out
by Cheryl Hopwood's suit against minority admissions policies at
the University of Texas Law School. Professor Hu-DeHart
concludes by calling for a reexamination of affirmative action to
take into account the particular needs of each disenfranchised
group.
What then is the future of affirmative action? The denial of
certiorari in Hopwood leaves the question of racial preference
programs unresolved. Legal foundations determined to strike
down affirmative action once and for all continue to look for the
perfect case to challenge Bakke. In March 1997, both the
University of Washington School of Law and the University
System of Georgia faced lawsuits challenging the ways they used
race in admissions. 6 Regardless of whether one of them will
become the test case, there is no doubt that the threat those suits
pose will chill higher education diversity policies.
Before California voted to end affirmative action, the Regents
of the University of California, led by the same Ward Connerly
who authored California's Proposition 209, voted to dismantle
affirmative action in admissions. 7 Bills to similar effect are
pending in Congress and several states. Time will determine
whether these bills will pass and what long-range consequences
they will have on minorities and women in education and the
workplace. Meanwhile, both sides have yet to grapple fully with
the issue underlying the affirmative action debate, namely: race
matters more to Americans than many are willing to admit.
16. See Marsha King, Affirmative Action Foes Targeted UW in National Legal
Strategy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at Al; Patrick Healy, A Lawsuit Against
Georgia University System Attacks a Range of Race-Based Policies, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 14, 1997, at A25.
17. See, e.g., Barry Bearak, A Life in Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1997, §1, at 1; Orlando Patterson, Affirmative Action, on the Merit System, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at A3.
